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The Paradox of Disallowing 
Duress as a Defence to Murder
Kenneth J. Arenson*
Abstract The common law has long recognised that what would otherwise 
constitute murder should be reduced to the lesser offence of voluntary 
manslaughter in instances where the accused was induced to kill because of 
provocative conduct on the part of the deceased that does not amount to 
lawful excuse or justification such as self-defence or defence of others. In 
what is often termed as a reasonable concession to human frailty, the law 
has opted to treat those who kill under such circumstances as less morally 
blameworthy than those who kill in the absence of such provocation or 
other mitigating circumstances such as a genuinely held, albeit objectively 
unreasonable belief, that the use of deadly force was necessary in self-
defence or the defence of another person. In sharp contrast, the common 
law has steadfastly declined to allow the defence of duress to be interposed 
in like manner as a partial defence to the crime of murder. The discussion to 
follow will examine whether this disparate treatment is justifiable in light of 
the stated underpinnings of these defences. The discussion will conclude by 
exploring various proposals for reform and the extent to which they are 
likely to result in sanctions that are commensurate with the relative degrees 
of moral culpability of those who seek to interpose these defences as 
complete or partial defences to the crime of murder.
Keywords Provocation; Duress; Human frailty; Person of ordinary 
firm ness
The common law defence of provocation can be traced back to the 17th 
century.1 It was spawned out of a concession to human frailty or, if you 
will, a recognition that ordinary persons can, in response to sufficient 
provocation on the part of the deceased, resort to the use of deadly force 
and commit what would otherwise constitute murder were it not for the 
partial defence of provocation. The term ‘partial defence’ is used in this 
context because a successful interposition of the defence requires a jury to 
acquit on the charge of murder and instead convict on the lesser charge of 
voluntary manslaughter that, unlike murder, was not a capital offence in 
the 17th century.2 The requirements of the defence were enunciated by 
King J in the following passage from R v The Queen:3 
 * Associate Professor, Deakin University School of Law, BA, University of Kentucky; JD, 
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  I wish to thank my research assistant, Nicole Rowan, for her excellent contribution to 
this article.
 1 For a judicial examination of the history of the defence, see Parker v The Queen (1963) 
111 CLR 610 (Windeyer J). See also J. Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 1992).
 2 R v Hayward (1836) 6 C&P 157 at 159 (Tindall J).
 3 R v The Queen (1981) 28 SASR 321.
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The killing of one person by another with intention to kill or do serious bodily 
harm is murder. Such a killing may, however, be reduced to manslaughter if the 
killing results from a sudden and temporary loss of self-control on the part of 
the killer which is brought by acts or words of the deceased amounting in law 
to provocation. To amount to provocation the acts or words must satisfy the 
following tests: (1) they must be done or said by the deceased to or in the 
presence of the killer; (2) they must have caused in the killer a sudden and 
temporary loss of self-control rendering the killer so subject to passion as to 
make him for the moment not the master of his mind; (3) they must be of such 
character as might cause an ordinary person to lose his self-control to such an 
extent as to act as the killer has acted.4
Readers should be aware that this formulation has undergone some 
important changes in more recent times.5
Suffice it to say that notwithstanding the recent common law and 
statutory modifications noted above,6 the foregoing exposition of the 
purpose, operation and constituent elements of the defence is more than 
adequate to draw attention to the profound distinction and resulting 
consequences that have long existed between it and the common law 
defences of duress and necessity in murder prosecutions. In particular, 
much of the balance of the discussion will focus on the hypocrisy and 
sheer folly of the judicial and legislative branches of government in 
 4 Above n. 3 at 321–2. For a Privy Council decision in which the defence is thoroughly 
canvassed, see: Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665. See also Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (Hein: 1980) 63; H. A. Snelling, 
‘Manslaughter Upon Provocation’ (1958) 31 Australian Law Journal 790 at 790–2. In the 
UK, the common law defence of provocation has been supplanted by the ‘loss of control 
defence’ by virtue of s. 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This is also a partial 
defence that may reduce liability from murder to voluntary manslaughter. The ‘loss of 
control defence’ is, in reality, similar to the former provocation defence and designed to 
alleviate the criticisms of provocation; to wit: the requirement of suddenness has been 
removed (s. 54(2)) which enables victims of cumulative abuse to plead this defence; the 
introduction of qualifying triggers has narrowed the range of acts or events that may be 
relied upon (s. 55); and fear, rather than only a thing said or done, is one such 
qualifying trigger (s. 55(4)). It is noted that these elements under the ‘loss of control 
defence’ are remarkably similar to the modifications that have been made to the 
common law defence of provocation in Australia: see below n. 5.
 5 For example, the requirement of suddenness has been construed to mean that the 
accused’s intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm must not have formed 
independently of the provocation offered by the deceased; rather, a significant causal 
nexus must be shown to have existed between the requisite mens rea for murder and the 
acts and/or words that are being relied upon by the accused as the foundation for the 
defence of provocation: R v The Queen (1981) 28 SASR 321 at 325. Suddenness is also 
viewed as relevant evidence that the accused killed at a time when he or she was still 
operating under a state of loss of self-control resulting from the deceased’s provocative 
acts, words or both: Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158 at 166–7 (Mason J). 
There have also been certain judicial modifications insofar as which, if any, of the 
personal attributes of the accused such as his or her age or gender, for example, are to 
be taken into account in deciding whether the so-called objective component of the 
provocation defence has been satisfied, see Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 
324, 327; Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 129 ALR 575 at 581. For the English view on 
which of the accused’s personal attributes were to be imputed in applying the objective 
component of the common law defence of provocation prior to the advent of s. 55 of 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, see DPP v Camplin [1978] AC 705, per Lord Diplock; 
R v Morhall [1996] AC 90; Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23. 
 6 See, e.g., Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 324, 327; Masciantonio v The Queen 
(1995) 129 ALR 575 at 581. For an example of a statutory version of the defence that 
has arguably deviated to some extent from the common law version, see Crimes Act 
1900 (NSW), s. 23(3)(b).
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Australia and the UK for allowing provocation, but not duress or necessity, 
to be interposed as partial defences to the crime of murder.7 In addition, 
the article will conclude that aside from the fact that the justifications for 
such an anomaly cannot withstand careful analysis, there is a far more 
compelling argument to be made that one who commits what would 
otherwise be murder under duress or necessity is far less morally culpable 
than one who does so under provocation. At a minimum, therefore, these 
defences should similarly operate as partial defences to a charge of murder. 
Finally, attention will focus on two viable proposals for reform, including 
one that the writer favours on the basis that it is better suited to result in 
consequences that are commensurate with the relative blameworthiness 
of the accused’s conduct. 
The purpose and scope of the defences of compulsion
The common law defences of duress8 and necessity 9 are founded on the 
precept that one should not incur criminal liability for crimes committed 
due to factors beyond his or her control such as, for example, a threat 
from another that the accused or another person would be killed or 
grievously injured if he or she refused to commit a crime or crimes 
nominated by the person or persons making the threat.10 The defence of 
necessity is similar to duress in that the accused is likewise coerced into 
committing a crime due to mitigating circumstances beyond his or her 
control, but differs in that the latter, by definition, requires that the 
coercion consist of threats of human as opposed to non-human origin. 
For example, finding oneself dying of starvation and thirst after surviving 
a shipwreck and, as a consequence, having to confront a horrific 
choice; specifically, allow oneself to perish slowly or, alternatively, murder 
 7 After ignoring the recommendation of the Victorian Law Reform Commission in 1980 
(and 1991), however, Victoria has now created statutory defences of duress and 
necessity and made them available as complete defences to the crime of murder: 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Duress, Necessity and Coercion, Report No. 9 (1980) 7; 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 9AG, 9AI. It is noteworthy that s. 9AI is referred to in the Act 
as ‘[s]udden or extraordinary emergency’, although its requirements substantially 
follow the common law defence of necessity as set out in the Victorian and New South 
Wales cases of R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 at 449 and R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 
542 at 545 respectively. 
  At common law, duress is not a defence to the crime of attempted murder: R v Gotts 
[1992] 1 All ER 832. Insofar as the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 9AG and 9AI are 
concerned, attempted murder is not a ‘relevant offence’ as defined in s 9AB of the Act. 
Thus, it appears that neither of these sections is available as a defence to attempted 
murder. There is nothing in logic or principle, however, that would justify this 
dichotomy, and one can only hope that the Victorian Court of Appeal or Parliament will 
take appropriate remedial measures. As to whether provocation is available to reduce 
attempted murder to attempted voluntary manslaughter, there is a split of authority:  
K. J. Arenson, ‘The Pitfalls in the Law of Attempt: A New Perspective’ [2005] 69 JCL 
146 at 153–4. In the writer’s view, if the intention to kill was induced by sufficient 
provocation to reduce the offence to voluntary manslaughter if the victim had died, it 
would be appropriate to either ‘charge the accused with attempted voluntary 
manslaughter or, if the charge is attempted murder, to direct the jury that it can convict 
on the lesser charge of attempted voluntary manslaughter’: ibid. at 154.
 8 R v Dawson [1978] VR 536; Nguyen v The Queen (2008) 181 A Crim R 72; R v Abusafiah 
(1991) 24 NSWLR 531.
 9 R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 at 444; R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 at 542.
10 R v Dawson [1978] VR 536 at 543.
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another survivor whose death is imminent in the hope that it may result 
in a longer period of survival during which another ship might fortuitously 
effect a life-sustaining rescue.11 
Duress and necessity, though separate and distinct defences that consist 
of different elements (see below), are similar in many ways and are capable 
of overlapping in instances that involve crimes committed under threats of 
human origin made against the accused or another if the accused refused 
to commit the nominated offence or offences. For both illustrative and 
convenience purposes, however, our attention will henceforth be limited 
to an overview of the elements of the common law defence of duress and 
why the House of Lords and the overwhelming majority of Australian 
courts have, in sharp contrast to the defence of provocation, rejected it as 
a partial defence to murder.12 The central question is whether that distinc-
tion can survive careful analysis and, if not, what remedial action the 
judiciaries and legislatures in Australia and the UK should take in order to 
rectify or at least ameliorate the untenable consequences that are certain 
to continue in the absence of some form of remedial legislation or exercise 
of the courts’ inherent power to develop the common law incrementally.
The constituent elements and core justification of duress at 
common law
In R v Hurley and Murray,13 Smith J enumerated the constituent elements 
of duress at common law:
[T]he accused has been required to do the act charged against him (i) under a 
threat that death or grievous bodily harm will be inflicted unlawfully upon a 
human being if the accused fails to do the act and (ii) the circumstances were 
such that a person of ordinary firmness would have been likely to yield to the 
threat in the way the accused did and (iii) the threat was present and continuing, 
imminent and impending … (iv) the accused reasonably apprehended that the 
threat would be carried out and (v) he was induced thereby to commit the 
crime charged and (vi) that the crime was not murder, nor any other crime so 
heinous as to be excepted from the doctrine and (vii) the accused did not, by 
fault on his part when he was free from the duress, expose himself to its 
11 R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273. This was a case in which two shipwreck 
survivors were confronted with exactly that choice and opted to murder another 
survivor who was much closer to death. A fourth survivor refused to take part in the 
murder or the consumption of the deceased’s body parts. After the three surviving crew 
members were subsequently rescued by a passing British vessel, the two survivors who 
partook in the murder admitted to having committed it as their sole means of having 
any chance of survival. The two were later convicted of murder with Lord Coleridge 
opining that even if the common law were to recognise a defence of necessity generally, 
it could never be interposed as a defence to murder for want of any workable standards 
as to which life or lives should be spared in preference to others. His Lordship further 
opined that society is better served by holding all people to an idealistic and unrealistic 
standard whereby a higher premium is placed on preserving the life of another 
unoffending and innocent person rather than one’s own life: ibid. at 287. 
12 Western Australia v Auckram [2013] WASC 69; R v McConnell [1977] 1 NSWLR 714. See 
also D. W. Elliot, ‘Necessity, Duress and Self-Defence’ [1989] Crim LR 611.
13 R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526.
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application and (viii) he had no means, with safety to himself, of preventing the 
execution of the threat.14
At first glance it appears that there are eight elements upon which the 
accused must satisfy the evidential burden, following which the Crown 
will be required to satisfy the legal burden of negating one or more of 
these elements beyond reasonable doubt in order to render the defence 
nugatory.15 This is assuming, of course, that the Crown has been successful 
in satisfying its own evidential burden as to both the elements of the 
crime(s) charged as well as the accused’s complicity therein.16 In fact, 
however, it was subsequently held that Smith J’s comment from the 
above-quoted passage that ‘the accused has been required to do the act 
charged against him’17 adds a ninth element; namely, that the crime or 
crimes with which the accused stands charged must be an offence or 
offences nominated by the person or persons making the threats.18 Insofar 
14 Above n. 13 at 543. Although there is no universally accepted statement of which 
elements comprise the common law defence of necessity, it has been defined at the 
appellate level in two of the three Australian common law jurisdictions. In R v Loughnan 
[1981] VR 443, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that three components must be 
satisfied in order to succeed in this defence: first, the crime or crimes must have been 
committed only for the purpose of protecting the accused or someone that he or she 
was obligated to protect; secondly, that the accused must have believed on reasonable 
grounds that he or she or the person or persons they were obliged to protect had been 
placed in a position of impending danger; and lastly, that the crime or crimes allegedly 
committed by the accused must not have exceeded what a reasonable person in like 
circumstances would have deemed necessary to avert the danger. In R v Rogers (1996) 
86 A Crim R 542, and on facts quite similar to those in Loughnan, the New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal adopted a formulation of the necessity defence that is 
arguably identical in substance to the one adopted in Loughnan; specifically, whether the 
accused believed on reasonable grounds that it was necessary to act in the manner that 
he or she did.
15 P. Gillies, Criminal Law, 4th edn (LBC Information Services: 1997) 356.
16 Ibid. at 341.
17 R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526, 543.
18 R v Dawson [1978] VR 536 at 538 (Anderson J), 543 (Harris J). In Dawson, the accused 
was serving a long prison term for various robbery convictions. He had received threats 
from unknown sources within the prison that he would be murdered. Having been 
stabbed on at least three prior occasions by other inmates, he opted to escape as a 
means of averting the threat. After he was later apprehended and charged with the 
crime of escape, his attempt to raise a defence of duress at trial was rejected on the basis 
that because the crime of escape was not an offence nominated by the person or 
persons making the threat against his life, he had failed to meet the evidential burden 
on what Dawson effectively held to be the ninth element of duress at common law. On 
appeal, Anderson and Harris JJ upheld the decision of the trial judge and dismissed the 
appeal.
  Although the Full Supreme Court of Victoria made it abundantly clear in Dawson, that 
the crime or crimes with which the accused stands charged must be an offence of 
offences nominated by the person or persons making the threats, it did not address the 
important question of whether this is true of offences that are closely related to or, 
stated differently, incidental to those specifically nominated by the person or persons 
making the threat. If, e.g., one is forced to commit armed robbery of a bank under a 
threat of death or grievous bodily harm to the accused or another person, can the 
accused also raise the defence of duress if he or she commits an assault by pointing a 
gun at a patron who attempts to foil the robbery? The writer believes that in order to 
avoid unduly harsh results, the defence should also extend to any crimes that are 
closely related to or incidental to the ones nominated by the person or persons making 
the threats. By the same token, if the accused commits a gratuitous offence that is 
properly characterised as a personal frolic that is in no way incidental to the planned 
criminal enterprise, there appears to be no justification for allowing duress to be 
interposed as a defence. This would occur, e.g., if the person threatened into committing 
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as the other eight elements are concerned, only one requires explanation 
for purposes of this article. In particular, element (ii) mandates that ‘the 
circumstances were such that a person of ordinary firmness19 would have 
been likely to yield to the threat in the way the accused did’ (emphasis 
added).20 In writing for the majority in R v Howe,21 Lord Hailsham explained 
that this requirement constitutes the core justification for the defence of 
duress at common law. 
In rejecting the appellant’s assertion that duress could be invoked as a 
partial defence to murder,22 Lord Hailsham opined (the first reason) that 
the defence emanated out of a recognition that a ‘reasonable man of 
average courage’,23 when confronted with a threat of death or grievous 
bodily harm against oneself or another, could reasonably conclude that 
the commission of the crime represents the lesser of the two evils.24 When 
the subject offence is murder, however, his Lordship was of the view that 
as a matter of law, no reasonable man could ever conclude that the taking 
of an innocent life represents the lesser of the two evils.25 In support of this 
view, his Lordship wrote:
In such a case a reasonable man might reflect that one innocent human life 
is at least as valuable as his own or that of his loved one. In such a case a 
man cannot claim that he is choosing the lesser of two evils. Instead, he is 
embracing the cognate but morally disreputable principle that the end justifies 
the means.26
In addition, Lord Hailsham flouted the appellant’s assertion that because 
duress and provocation are analogous in that both are viewed as conces-
sions to human frailty,27 duress should similarly operate as a mitigating 
circumstance that reduces what would otherwise constitute murder to 
the lesser offence of voluntary manslaughter.28 In spurning this suggestion, 
his Lordship stressed (the second reason) that to allow duress to function 
in this manner would offend the longstanding common law precept that 
duress, when successfully invoked, results in an outright acquittal that is 
unadulterated by the opprobrium engendered by most convictions.29 
the bank robbery decided to abduct and rape one of the female patrons while affecting 
an escape following the robbery. Here, public policy demands that the law create a 
disincentive rather than an incentive for the accused to extricate himself or herself from 
further criminal activity at the first reasonable opportunity.
19 R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526 at 543. Readers will note that as with provocation, 
element (ii) of the Hurley and Murray formulation is based on an ‘ordinary’ as opposed 
to a ‘reasonable’ man standard: ibid. In R v Howe [1987] AC 417 at 421 the House of 
Lords spoke in terms of the reasonable man rather than a person of ordinary firmness as 
did Smith J in Hurley and Murray.
20 R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526, 543.
21 R v Howe [1987] AC 417.
22 Ibid. at 423–38.
23 Ibid. at 432.
24 Ibid. at 433.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. at 435.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
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In further addressing this issue, Lord Hailsham opined (the third reason) 
that the suggestion advanced by the appellant is inimical to basic principle.30 
In amplifying this point, Lord Hailsham wrote that
[p]rovocation … is a concession to human frailty due to the extent that even a 
reasonable man may, under sufficient provocation temporarily lose his self 
control [sic] towards the person who has provoked him enough. Duress … is a 
concession to human frailty in that it allows a reasonable man to make a 
conscious choice between the reality of the immediate threat and what he may 
reasonably regard as the lesser of two evils.31
Although maladroitly expressed, the above-quoted passage suggests that 
although both defences are steeped in the notion of concessions to human 
frailty,32 it is only in the case of the latter that a reasonable person could 
justifiably conclude that the commission of a crime represents the lesser of 
two evils.33 When the crime is murder, however, the House of Lords held 
that a reasonable person could never justifiably conclude that the taking 
of an innocent life represents the lesser of the two evils.34 This stands in 
sharp contrast to the defence of provocation which is grounded on the 
tenet that ordinary35 persons may, when subjected to sufficient provocative 
conduct on the part of the deceased, lose self-control to such an extent as 
to resort to the use of deadly force that is neither justifiable nor excusable 
in the eyes of the criminal law.36 Thus, Lord Hailsham’s majority opinion 
in Howe rejected the appellant’s argument that as a concession to human 
frailty, the common law defence of duress should also operate as a partial 
defence to murder.37
30 Above n. 21.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid. at 433.
35 Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312, 326–31 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh JJ). In Stingel, the High Court held that in applying the 
defence of provocation, the ‘ordinary’ person as opposed to ‘reasonable’ person is the 
correct standard to be applied to the so-called objective element of the defence which 
now requires that the deceased’s provocative conduct be of such a character as might 
have caused an ordinary person to lose self-control to such an extent as to act as the 
accused did. The court explained that this was preferable to a ‘reasonable’ person 
standard because a reasonable person would not kill without lawful justification or 
excuse. This further underscores the point that provocation, when successfully invoked, 
does not result in an outright acquittal, but merely reduces what would otherwise 
constitute murder to the lesser offence of voluntary manslaughter.
36 Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 329.
37 R v Howe [1987] AC 417 at 435. Before Howe, the defence of duress was allowed for an 
accessory to murder: R v Kray (1969) 53 Cr App R 569; DPP (Northern Ireland) v Lynch 
[1975] AC 653. Obiter dicta from Howe was followed by the Court of Appeal in Gotts, 
holding that the defence of duress was not available as a defence to attempted murder: 
R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412. The position in South Australia is identical to that espoused 
in Howe and later reaffirmed by the House of Lords in R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22. In R v 
Brown and Morley [1968] SASR 467, the Supreme Court of South Australia held that 
duress is not available as a defence to murder, and this is true irrespective of whether 
one is charged as a principal offender or an accomplice. In New South Wales, the 
current position is that duress is unavailable as a defence to one who is charged with 
murder as a principal offender, but is available to one who is charged as an accessory to 
murder, meaning as a principal in the second degree or an accessory before the fact: 
McConnell v The Queen [1977] 1 NSWLR 714. In McConnell, the original decision of Nagle 
J, that duress was available as a defence to a principal in the second degree, was upheld. 
Many jurisdictions such as the UK and South Australia have recognised that an 
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Examining the justifications offered by the House of Lords 
for rejecting duress as a partial defence to murder
In examining each of the reasons put forth by Lord Hailsham for rejecting 
the appellant’s argument, the first and third are not only closely related 
and overlapping, but strike at the very core of the longstanding resistance 
of nearly all judiciaries and legislatures38 to allowing duress to operate as 
a partial defence to murder. As both are premised on the notion that no 
ordinary person could reasonably conclude that the taking of an innocent 
life represents the lesser of the two evils, a question arises as to whether 
this notion can withstand careful analysis. 
Suppose, for example, that a mother and her six-year-old daughter are 
kidnapped at gunpoint and taken to a shack in a desolate wooded area. 
Much to the mother’s surprise, another six-year-old girl is also being held 
there against her will. The kidnapper, a 30-year-old man, loads a handgun 
within eyesight of the mother, points the gun at her daughter, and then 
places a butcher knife on the floor. The kidnapper then demands that the 
mother pick up the knife and stab the other six-year-old girl to death. He 
then adds that if she refuses, he will shoot and kill her daughter. While it 
is impossible to know what percentage of mothers of six-year-old daughters 
would elect to sacrifice their own daughter’s life rather than that of another 
innocent child, the writer believes that the overwhelming majority of 
mothers would opt to save their own child even if it meant killing someone 
else’s child in order to do so.39 In this dreadful scenario, the fact is that 
whichever option the mother chooses, an innocent human being is going 
to have his or her life taken.
Given these unpleasant realities, how much credence should be 
accorded to Lord Hailsham’s pronouncement that duress can never be a 
accomplice who plans a criminal scheme can be more blameworthy than a principal 
offender. A good example of this would be the Nazi hierarchy of Hitler, Heydrich, 
Himler, Goring and others who planned the mass genocide of the Jews and others as 
compared with those who carried out the genocide in the knowledge that they would 
be summarily executed if they refused. For the position in Victoria, see the Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic), s. 9AG (read together with s. 9AB(1)) that creates a statutory form of duress 
that is available as a complete defence to murder. In the UK, duress is not available as a 
defence to murder despite the recommendations of the Law Commission: Law 
Commission, Partial Defences to Murder—Final Report (2004) 69; Law Commission, 
Offences Against the Person and General Principles, Law Com. Consultation Paper No. 218 
(1993) 48–64, 104–7. Lord Hailsham’s reasoning in Howe was more recently reaffirmed 
in R v Wilson [2007] All ER (D) 228.
38 In Victoria, as noted earlier, the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 9AG and 9AI represent 
statutory versions of the common law defences of duress and necessity respectively. 
These sections do not represent mere codifications of the common law defences, but do 
mirror them to a significant degree, the most important difference being that contrary to 
the common law position, both are available as complete defences to murder, whether 
as a principal offender or an accomplice, provided the statutory criteria are satisfied. It 
should be re-emphasised that although s. 9AI is termed ‘[s]udden or extraordinary 
emergency’, there is no question that it was intended to function as a statutory version 
of the common law defence of necessity enunciated in R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 and 
R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542.
39 In the writer’s 19 years of teaching criminal law in Australia, and having put this 
question to nearly 2,000 students, not a single one indicated that he or she would opt to 
sacrifice his or her own child in favour of someone else’s. Even if there had been some 
who disagreed, that would hardly be evidence to support Lord Hailsham’s majority view 
that the taking of an innocent life can never represent the lesser of the two evils.
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defence to murder, whether as a principal offender or an accomplice,40 
because no reasonable person would ever regard the taking of an innocent 
life as the lesser of the two evils? If the answer is very little, then the major 
underpinning of the rule of law that eliminates duress as a complete or 
partial defence to murder has been emasculated beyond recognition. That 
raises the central question for purposes of this article; specifically, who is 
the more blameworthy as between a person who kills under sufficient 
provocation to reduce his or her conviction from murder to voluntary 
manslaughter, or a person who, despite the total absence of fault on his 
or her part, chooses to take an innocent life at the direction of another or 
others who have threatened to take his or her life or that of another 
innocent person if he or she refuses to follow the direction? The writer 
believes the answer to be so obvious that there is little, if any, room for 
debate.41 
Readers will recall that Lord Hailsham’s majority opinion gave one 
additional reason for declining to allow duress to operate as a partial 
defence to murder in the same manner as provocation does in the UK and 
all but three of the Australian jurisdictions: precedent.42 His Lordship opined 
that when successfully invoked, the defence of duress has historically 
entitled the accused to a complete acquittal in respect of the charge or 
charges to which it relates. Yet Lord Hailsham readily acknowledged that 
under the law of the UK as it existed prior to the House of Lords’ decision 
in Howe, duress was available as a complete defence to the crime of murder, 
provided the accused was charged as an accomplice rather than a principal 
40 R v Howe [1987] AC 417 at 433. For views in opposition to Lord Hailsham’s reasoning in 
Howe, see I. Dennis, ‘Developments in Duress’ (1987) 51 JCL 463 at 469–71;  
P. Alldridge, ‘Duress and the Reasonable Person’ (1983) 34 Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 125; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Duress, Necessity and Coercion, Report 
No. 9 (1980) 19–23.
41 Again, in the writer’s 19 years of teaching criminal law and having put this question to 
nearly 2,000 students, the writer has never encountered one who believed that a person 
who kills under duress is more blameworthy than one who kills under circumstances 
that would allow him or her to invoke successfully the defence of provocation. To the 
contrary, the students have been unanimous in concluding that the latter is the more 
blameworthy of the two.
42 R v Howe [1987] AC 417, 430. In Australia, Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia 
have abolished the defence of provocation: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 3B; Criminal Code 
Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act 2003 (Tas); Criminal Law 
Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008 (WA). In New South Wales, a Select Committee on 
the Partial Defence of Provocation was established on 14 June 2012 and reported on  
23 April 2013: Legislative Council Select Committee on the Partial Defence of 
Provocation, Parliament of New South Wales, The Partial Defence of Provocation (2013). 
This report recommends that the NSW Government retain the defence renamed as ‘the 
partial defence of gross provocation’ (recommendation 4) and make relevant changes to 
s. 23 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which affect both the elements of the defence, 
circumstances where it may be claimed and evidentiary provisions. This reform towards 
a ‘gross provocation’ model is based on the UK Law Commission’s recommendation 
(which was not followed by the UK legislature: see above n. 37): Law Commission, 
Partial Defences to Murder—Final Report (2004). The report also recommends that ‘the 
NSW Government introduce an amendment similar to section 9AH of the Victorian 
Crimes Act 1958, to explicitly provide that evidence of family violence may be adduced in 
homicide matters’ (recommendation 2). See also K. Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Provocation in New 
South Wales: The Need for Abolition’ (2012) 45 Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology 194. In New Zealand, the Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Act 
2009 (NZ) abolished the partial defence of provocation. 
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offender.43 If the doctrine of stare decisis is so sacrosanct that it must be 
followed even in the face of compelling arguments to the contrary, one 
cannot help but see the irony in purporting to accord such reverence to 
the doctrine in the same judgment in which it was flagrantly eschewed.
What remedial action should be taken by various 
legislatures and judiciaries to rectify the anomaly that 
provocation, but not duress, operates as a partial defence 
to the crime of murder?
Assuming readers agree that there is no reason in logic or principle for 
permitting provocation, but not duress, to operate as a partial defence to 
murder, the question becomes one of how best to rectify what may be seen 
as one of the most longstanding and obvious paradoxes in the criminal 
law. One solution would be simply to abolish the defence of provocation 
as is becoming increasingly common.44 Although readers must consult, for 
example, the Second Reading Speech of the Crimes (Homicide) Bill 2005 
(Vic) to be informed of all the factors that prompted the Victorian 
Parliament to abolish provocation as a defence,45 the writer had a most 
intriguing conversation with a distinguished person who has since become 
a Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria. In discussing what was then a 
mere proposal to enact legislation abolishing the defence in Victoria, the 
writer commented that if the proposal had already reached fruition, a 
woman accused of murder at the time and seeking to interpose provocation 
as a partial defence might be left with no viable defence despite her claim 
of mitigating circumstances. The person’s response was that the type of 
scenario to which the writer was referring, meaning a woman accused of 
murdering her husband or boyfriend, ‘rarely happens’ and, furthermore, 
that the proposal should become law because ‘provocation is a defence 
that is used by men who murder their wives and girlfriends’.
Astounded by these comments, the writer’s response was to ask whether 
the continued availability of the defence should be contingent upon which 
of the two genders relied upon it more often when charged with the 
murder of a husband, wife, boyfriend or girlfriend of the opposite sex. 
Specifically, the writer asked whether the defence should be retained if 
statistics showed that women who killed their husbands or boyfriends 
accounted for more than 50 per cent of the cases in which provocation 
was relied upon as a partial defence to murder. When the person appeared 
to be dismissive of the question and merely reiterated that ‘provocation is 
rarely used by women who kill their husbands or boyfriends’, the writer 
43 R v Howe [1987] AC 417 439, citing R v Kray (1969) 53 Cr App R 569 at 576ff 
(extending the defence to those charged with murder as accessories before the fact); 
DPP (Northern Ireland) v Lynch [1975] AC 653 at 671–2, 674–8 (Lord Morris), 685 (Lord 
Wilberforce), 615–6 (Lord Edmund-Davies) (extending the defence to those charged 
with murder as principals in the second degree).
44 See above n. 42.
45 See Second Reading Speech of Crimes (Homicide) Bill 2005 (Vic). The typical reasons 
given for reform in this area appear to relate to gender-based matters. For example, in 
the Second Reading Speech of the Victorian Bill, it commences with references to the 
murder of two women where the defence of provocation was relevant.
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took that as a concession that the answer was ‘yes’. If the continued 
existence of provocation or any other defence is made to depend on which 
of the two genders invokes it more often, then what remains of the 
cardinal precept that all persons are equal before the law? Taken to its 
logical extreme, the continued existence of all defences such as self-
defence, defence of others, necessity, insanity and diminished capacity, for 
example, would also be made to depend on a statistical breakdown of 
which of the two genders invokes them more often. Irrespective of one’s 
attitude towards gender-based issues, most, if not all persons, would find 
such an approach to be indefensible.
If, as noted earlier, the impetus for the emergence of provocation as a 
partial defence to murder in the 17th century was as a concession to 
human frailty, one might ask what has changed in the past 300 plus years 
that would justify its abolition? It is the writer’s view that the common law 
defence of provocation, as with excessive self-defence or excessive-force- 
manslaughter as it is often referred to,46 is based on the sound and 
humanitarian principle that there are certain mitigating circumstances 
which, if proved, should operate to reduce what would otherwise consti-
tute murder to the lesser offence of voluntary manslaughter.47 Stated 
differently, murder requires the presence of malice aforethought48 that the 
common law regards as lacking in instances in which the killing occurs 
under prescribed extenuating circumstances that are sufficient to reduce 
the conviction to voluntary manslaughter.49 In the overwhelming majority 
of jurisdictions that continue to recognise provocation as a partial defence 
to murder, provocative conduct on the part of the deceased is one of those 
extenuating circumstances,50 provided it is of such a character as might 
46 Another mitigating circumstance that is recognised in many common law jurisdictions 
as sufficient to negate malice aforethought and reduce what would otherwise be murder 
to voluntary manslaughter is when the accused kills under the subjective belief that 
deadly force is necessary to protect himself or herself or others from death or grievous 
bodily harm, but the fact-finder does not accept, from an objective standpoint, that the 
belief was based on reasonable grounds. This is known as the doctrine of excessive 
self-defence or excessive-force-manslaughter: R v Bozikis [1981] VR 587; Da Costa v The 
Queen (1968) 118 CLR 186; R v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448, but see Zecevic v Director of 
Public Prosecutions (1987) 71 ALR 641, a case in which the High Court abolished the 
doctrine under Australian common law doctrine). By virtue of statutes in South 
Australia, New South Wales and Victoria, the doctrine has now been reinstated: 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s. 15; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s. 421; and 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 9AC, 9AD. See also P. Fairall and S. Yeo, Criminal Defences in 
Australia, 4th edn (Lexisnexis Butterworths: Chatswood NSW, 2005) 178–9; S. Yeo, ‘The 
Demise of Excessive Self-Defence in Australia’ (1988) 37 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 348; S. Yeo, ‘Revisiting Excessive Self-Defence (2000) 12 Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice 39; S. Yeo, ‘Excessive Self-Defence, Macauley’s Penal Code and Universal 
Law’ (1991) 7 Australian Bar Review 223.
47 Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665 at 676 (Lord Morris). Malice aforethought, 
despite what it appears to entail, does not require that the accused acted with hatred or 
had given the matter a high degree of prior planning. Rather, it is a term of art which 
denotes an unlawful homicide that occurred under circumstances that amount to 
murder at common law: K. J. Arenson, M. Bagaric and P. Gillies, Australian Criminal Law 
in the Common Law Jurisdictions: Cases and Materials, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press: 
Melbourne, 2011) 42.
48 Arenson, Bagaric and Gillies, above n. 47.
49 Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665 at 677 (Lord Morris).
50 Ibid.; Mogilkoff v The Queen [2010] NTCCA 10; R v McCullagh (No. 3) (2007) 179 A Crim R 
334; Verhoeven v The Queen (1998) 101 A Crim R 24.
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have induced an ordinary person to lose self-control to such an extent as 
to act as the accused did.51 The writer’s view is that nothing has changed 
since that time that would justify the abolition of the defence. 
In Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia where the defence of 
provocation has been abolished,52 one possible solution is to enact 
legislation that codifies the common law version of the defence or some 
variation of it. Victoria, Western Australia, the ACT and the Commonwealth 
have already addressed the apparent anomaly discussed throughout this 
article by creating a statutory defence of duress that, if successfully invoked, 
constitutes a complete defence to murder.53 If one accepts the writer’s view 
51 R v The Queen (1981) 28 SASR 321, 321–2.
52 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 3B; Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of 
Provocation) Act 2003 (Tas); Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Bill 2008 (WA).
53 Section 9AG of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provides: 
(1) A person is not guilty of a relevant offence in respect of conduct carried out by him 
or her under duress.
(2) A person carries out conduct under duress if and only if the person reasonably 
believes that—
(a) subject to subsection (3), a threat has been made that will be carried out unless 
an offence is committed; and
(b) carrying out the conduct is the only reasonable way that the threatened harm 
can be avoided; and
(c)  the conduct is a reasonable response to the threat.
(3) However, a person does not carry out conduct under duress if the threat is made by 
or on behalf of a person with whom the person is voluntarily associating for the 
purpose of carrying out violent conduct.
(4) This section only applies in the case of murder if the threat is to inflict death or 
really serious injury. 
The Criminal Code (ACT), s. 40 provides:
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person carries out the 
conduct required for the offence under duress.
(2) A person carries out conduct under duress only if the person reasonably believes 
that— 
(a) a threat has been made that will be carried out unless an offence is committed; 
and 
(b) there is no reasonable way to make the threat ineffective; and 
(c) the conduct is a reasonable response to the threat. 
(3) However, the person does not carry out conduct under duress if the threat is made 
by or on behalf of a person with whom the person is voluntarily associating to carry 
out conduct of the kind required for the offence. 
The Criminal Code (Cth), s. 10.2 provides:
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if he or she carries out the 
conduct constituting the offence under duress. 
(2) A person carries out conduct under duress if and only if he or she reasonably 
believes that: 
(a) a threat has been made that will be carried out unless an offence is committed; 
and
(b) there is no reasonable way that the threat can be rendered ineffective; and 
(c) the conduct is a reasonable response to the threat. 
(3) This section does not apply if the threat is made by or on behalf of a person with 
whom the person under duress is voluntarily associating for the purpose of carrying 
out conduct of the kind actually carried out.
The Criminal Code (WA), s. 32 states: 
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an act done, or an omission made, under 
duress under subsection (2).
(2) A person does an act or makes an omission under duress if—
(a) the person believes—
(i) a threat has been made; and
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that a person who kills under duress is less blameworthy from a moral 
standpoint than one who kills in response to sufficient provocation to 
warrant a reduction to voluntary manslaughter, this proposal appears to 
strike a proper balance between the two defences and the consequences 
that ensue when they are successfully invoked. In jurisdictions other than 
Victoria, Western Australia, the ACT and the Commonwealth in which 
duress is neither a partial nor a complete defence to murder,54 the writer 
believes that the law should be changed accordingly.
A compromise position in jurisdictions other than Victoria, Western 
Australia, the ACT and the Commonwealth would be to enact legislation 
or alter the common law so as to make both provocation and duress 
available as partial defences to the crime of murder. If one accepts that a 
person who kills under duress is less blameworthy than one who kills in 
response to sufficient provocation to succeed in that defence, such a 
compromise would have the salutary effect of at least partially addressing 
the gross imbalance that currently exists between the two defences. It 
would not, however, create a regime whereby each defence, if successfully 
invoked, would entail consequences that are commensurate with the 
relative blameworthiness of the accused’s conduct. In the writer’s view, 
(ii) the threat will be carried out unless an offence is committed; and
(iii) doing the act or making the omission is necessary to prevent the threat from 
being carried out; and
(b) the act or omission is a reasonable response to the threat in the circumstances as 
the person believes them to be; and
(c) there are reasonable grounds for those beliefs.
(3) Subsections(1) and (2) do not apply if the threat is made by or on behalf of a person 
with whom the person under duress is voluntarily associating for the purpose of—
(a) doing an act or making an omission of the kind in fact done or made by the 
person under duress; or
(b) prosecuting an unlawful purpose in which it is reasonably foreseeable such a 
threat would be made. 
54 Duress is not available as a defence to murder in the Northern Territory, Queensland, 
Tasmania, South Australia, New South Wales, England, Ireland, Canada and New 
Zealand: Criminal Code (NT), s. 40; Criminal Code (Qld), s. 31(2); Criminal Code (Tas), 
s. 20(1); R v Brown and Morley [1968] SASR 467; McConnell v R [1977] 1 NSWLR 714. In 
New South Wales, the defence of duress is available to one who is charged as an 
accessory to murder: McConnell v R [1977] 1 NSWLR 714. For English law, see R v Gotts 
[1992] 2 AC 412. Previously the defence was allowed for an accessory to murder: DPP 
for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653. This, however, was overruled by R v Howe 
[1987] 1 AC 417. In Ireland, duress remains a common law defence. Attorney-General v 
Whelan [1934] IR 518 confirmed that duress is not available as a defence to the crime of 
murder. Ireland considered the defences of duress and necessity in the Law Reform 
Commission (Ireland), Report: Defences in Criminal Law (2009) and recommended that 
‘the defence of duress should be generally available as a defence, but not in the case of 
treason, murder or attempted murder’. The Canadian judiciary recently considered the 
defence of duress in R v Ryan [2013] SCC 3. The defence of duress (expressed as 
compulsion) is available to primary offenders except for listed offences that include 
murder and attempted murder: Criminal Code (RSC, 1985, c. C-46), s. 17. At common 
law, the defence of duress is available to those who are charged as accessories to any 
offence: Paquette v The Queen [1977] 2 SCR 189. In New Zealand, the defence of duress 
at common law is not a defence to murder: R v Howe [1987] AC 417; R v Dudley and 
Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273. The Crimes Act 1961 excludes murder and attempted 
murder (together with a number of other crimes) from application of the defence of 
compulsion: s. 24. The partial defence of provocation (formerly under the Crimes Act 
1961, s. 169) was repealed on 8 December 2009 by s. 4 of the Crimes (Provocation 
Repeal) Amendment Act 2009 (2009 No. 64).
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the proposal advanced in the preceding paragraph would, insofar as 
possible, achieve that objective. 
Conclusion
This article has examined the essential elements, operation and underlying 
rationale of the common law defences of provocation and duress. In so 
doing, particular attention has focused on the apparent anomaly that 
currently exists in many jurisdictions; specifically, an indefensible and 
strange dichotomy whereby the defence of provocation, but not duress, 
may be interposed as a partial defence to murder. 
What can be gleaned from the forgoing discussion is that the reasons 
enunciated by Lord Hailsham for refusing to allow duress to be interposed 
as a defence to murder are seriously flawed. Although it is unnecessary to 
go further than the above example involving the kidnapped mother and 
child in order to buttress this point, it requires nothing more than a 
rudimentary understanding of basic human instinct to appreciate that it 
is unrealistic to expect any person, let alone all people who are subject to 
the law as it now exists in every jurisdiction other than Victoria, Western 
Australia, the ACT and the Commonwealth, to refuse to follow a direction 
to take an innocent life when the consequence of that refusal is all but 
certain to result in the loss of one’s own life or that of a close friend or 
family member. 
At present, there are no Australian jurisdictions, aside from Victoria,55 
Western Australia,56 the ACT57 and the Commonwelath58 that allow the 
defence of duress to be interposed as a complete defence to murder. Even 
in Victoria, s. 3B has statutorily abolished provocation as a partial defence 
to the same. The writer is unaware of any scientifically conducted survey 
which comports with the view that one who kills under duress is any 
more blameworthy than one who kills for no other reason than in response 
to provocative conduct on the part of the deceased that the law regards as 
within the normal ambit of human temperament.59 The failure of the 
writer to encounter a single student out of nearly 2,000 taught over the 
past 19 years, nor any other person who agrees with that view, cannot be 
ignored. Similarly, the writer has yet to encounter any person who concurs 
with Lord Hailsham’s core justification for refusing to allow duress as 
either a complete or partial defence to murder. Indeed, the example of the 
kidnapped mother and daughter is an unassailable argument against that 
justification.
This view is further buttressed by the fact that in order to succeed in the 
common law defence of duress, the accused must adduce sufficient 
evidence that he or she did not, through any fault on his or her part, and 
at a time when he or she was free of duress, expose himself or herself to 
55 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 9AG.
56 Criminal Code (WA), s. 32.
57 Criminal Code (ACT), s. 40.
58 Criminal Code (Cth), s. 10.2.
59 Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 328–9 (quoting R v Enright [1961] VR 663 at 
669 (Herring CJ, Smith and Hudson JJ).
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its application. The term ‘fault’ in this context was partially explained by 
Winneke CJ in the following passage from Hurley and Murray:
A person who without threat of death or serious violence voluntarily makes 
himself a party to a criminal enterprise cannot excuse his criminal conduct in 
participating in that enterprise by showing that after he had embraced the cause 
he was subjected to the threats of violence at the hands of other parties to 
ensure that he did not resile from the bargain he had voluntarily entered into.60 
In legal parlance, the term ‘fault’ denotes ordinary negligence at a mini mum, 
any other form of negligence such as recklessness or any of the mens reas that 
are expressly or presumptively61 made elements of a particular crime.62 
Thus, a constituent element of duress requires that the accused be free 
of any degree of fault in exposing himself or herself to the application of 
the threat that coerced him or her into committing the nominated 
offence(s). In the scenario postulated by Winneke CJ, any person who 
voluntarily makes himself or herself a party to a criminal enterprise is, at 
the very least, negligent, and therefore at fault in having exposed oneself 
to its application in the event that there is a subsequent attempt to resile 
from the criminal scheme.
For all of the reasons discussed throughout this piece, Lord Hailsham’s 
reasoning in Howe cannot withstand careful analysis. It is equally apparent 
that one who kills under duress63 at common law is less morally blame-
worthy than one who kills in response to provocation that would be a 
sufficient mitigating circumstance to reduce murder to the lesser offence 
of voluntary manslaughter. The writer has put forth three proposals to 
rectify what has long festered as an anomaly in the law that will inevitably 
lead to unfair results. The proposal that comes closest to ensuring that the 
consequences of conviction will be commensurate with the moral culp-
ability of the accused’s conduct is to retain the defence of provocation, 
whether by statute or common law doctrine and, at the same time, follow 
Victoria’s example by enacting a statutory version of duress that, if 
successfully invoked, constitutes a complete defence to murder. This 
makes eminently good sense if one accepts that a person who kills under 
duress should not be treated the same, much less worse, than a person 
who kills without lawful excuse and for no other reason than the anger 
that he or she feels as a consequence of provocative words, actions, or 
both on the part of the deceased. For centuries the law has not only 
declined to treat the two with parity, but has inexplicably opted to treat 
the more blameworthy person with more compassion than the one who 
is arguably devoid of any fault whatsoever.
This article has exposed this longstanding anomaly for the unfair and 
paradoxical rule that it is. It is the writer’s view that the time is long 
overdue for the legislative and judicial branches of the various governments 
to act on the proposal set out above. 
60 R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526 at 533.
61 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523 at 534.
62 Gillies, above n. 15 at 42.
63 Except, of course, for the requirement that the offence is not murder or some other 
offence so heinous as to be excluded from the defence: R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 
526 at 543.
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